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EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF THE
MENTAL STATE OF THE DEFENDANT
WILLIAM

A.

WHITE'

It is with some temerity that I attempt to discuss this somewhat
threadbare subject in these pages. In recent years so much has been
said about it and yet so little, for practically all of the papers revolve in
about the same circle and it is rare that any one of them throws any new
light upon the questions involved. The most striking thing perhaps
about the whole discussion is the vehemence with which everybody
denounces the present method of procedure and the comparative impotence of those same persons when presented with the necessity of a
constructive attitude of mind and asked what they are going to do about
it. My only excuse for discussing nt upon this occasion is that I
have been forced for a considerable period of time, not only to come
into practical relations with the operations of the methods of procedure
in criminal cases involving expert testimony, but that I have been
forced in addition to give all of the questions involved a considerable
deal of thought in my service for two or three years upon a committee
of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
I have referred to the discrepancy between the attitude of the
majority of persons who believe the system wrong and would tear it
down, and the results of their labors when they endeavored to build
anything in its place. This is a psychological situation with which we
are familiar, and must necessarily mean that the destructive attitude
is an emotional one, that the reasons for the feelings that exist against
the present method of procedure are not clearly perceived, and that
therefore no adequate constructive efforts can issue. In proof of this
proposition, namely, that the attitude against the system is an emotional
one, and that the reasons for the emotions are not clearly perceived, I
may cite the frequent efforts of the two professions-law and medicine
-each to lay the blame upon the other, while the general public see in
every criminal trial, where the defense of insanity is introduced, a
perfectly clear case of flagrant attempt to avoid the legal consequences
of crime by hiring expert witnesses to testify to the insanity of the
defendant. It is needless for me to disprove in this Journal the justifi'Superintendent of Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C.
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cation for such extreme attitudes of fifind. However, such attitudes
exist, such attitudes are facts, and it is pertinent to this inquiry to ask
why they exist, and to wonder if perhaps this question could be
answered. The answers might not illuminate the motives that give rise
to these emotional attitudes that I have already suggested, and so enable
the intelligence to grasp and deal with them more effectively.
The main difficulty, it seems to me, about the present method of
procedure is that it is not in fact what it pretends to be. The method
of trial of a criminal case before a jury is in the nature of a combat in
which two opposing forces are lined up against each other and the
battle goes to the strongest. The judge is a referee, if you will, whose
business it is to prevent fouls and the taking of unfair advantages.
How this system has grown up into its present state the gentlemen of
the law know better than I, but I do not believe they will. deny this
general proposition. Now into the arena where this battle is taking
place the expert witness is introduced. He is hired and paid by one of
the parties to the issue, his direct testimony is given in response to the
attorney representing that party. The attorney representing the opposite side then undertakes to tear to pieces the contributions to the evidence which he has made in favor of the side for which he was
employed. This is essentially and fundamentally a partisan conflict, and
the expert witness is asked to do something that society does not ask
of a man, so far as I know, in any other capacity. It asks him to preserve the same judicial attitude of mind which is expected of the judge
on the bench and to answer all questions fairly and impartially and
free from prejudice. Everywhere else where the best effort is demanded
of an individual, it is endeavored to make his personal interests run
parallel to the effort demanded. A man who owns, for example, a
department store, has elevators installed for the convenience of his
customers. He is not trusted, however, to take care of those elevators
because the fear is that he might not go to the expense necessary to
maintain them free from dangerous accident. This would be particularly true if he himself were seriously embarrassed financially. What
is the solution of such a problem? He must have his elevators insured.
What is the real insurance back of such requirement? A perfectly
patent one-that the insurance company, being responsible for all financial losses that may arise, due to accident dependent upon bad or wornout equipment, will see to it, because it is to their interest to see to it,
that the elevators are always safe. The expert witness, on the other
hand, is supposed to go on the witness stand, representing one side of
the controversy, receiving his compensation from that side, and then
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without hesitation, without any attempt to evade in any way the question at issue, he is expected the moment the opportunity presents itself

in the shape of a question to which an answer would be to the disadvantage of the side that has employed him, to give that answer.

The thing that astonishes me is not that medical expert testimony
is so bad, but that it is so good. My personal acquaintance with the
men who take the witness stand as expert witnesses makes me feel, in
fact makes me know, that they have measured up to the demands in a
way that seems to me little short of miraculous. They have not met the
demands absolutely, but if they have not it is not because they have not
tried, nor is it because they have not wanted to-it is because the
demand is psychologically an impossible one to meet. The witness generally errs in one of two directions-either he is distinctly partisan, or
because being in fear that he will be partisan, he leans over so far
backward that he unnecessarily injures the cause which he represents.
The former of the two errors is naturally the more frequent, but it is
not an error born of dishonesty, for far from having any intent to
deceive the witness honestly tries his best in the great majority of cases
to present his views fairly, but it is an error borne of a natural weakness of human nature as it fails before an impossible task.. It is this
partisanship which does, as a matter of fact, exist, no matter how
strongly it may be denied, which is at the bottom, in my estimation, of
the feeling attitude-toward the expert situation, but it is not a matter
solely to blame the medical man for. In my belief, he does his best;
he is only one wheel in the great machinery of the law, and that
machinery is not of his making. Unfortunately for him, however, he
occupies a position which temporarily gives him a place where all eyes
are centered upon him. He seems to bear the burden for the moment
of the entire system, and it is because of his prominent place on the
stage, because the spot-light is upon him, so to speak, that he has been
supposed by the public to be to blame. He is rarely personally to blame
at all. It is only his work which shows up to disadvantage in a system
which is wrong.
Having admitted the defect in the system, what are we going to do
about it? Let me first present the results .in the shape of a suggested
statute which the committee upon which I have served, and which I
mentioned above, has finally adopted as the result of its labors. I am
sure it is so plain that it requires no special comment. I may only say
that its preparation has extended over a considerable period of time
and that the committee has had much of the advice and opinion and
assistance of the best men in the country. It is a suggestion only for
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correcting the method of procedure as it now exists in so far as to
remove the element of partisanship, real or implied, that now exists in
that method, and it is a suggestion only in so far as we can hope to
succeed in its adoption and not have it torn down immediately it is put
into effect, because of being declared unconstitutional. The committee
has therefore kept well within the bounds of what it believes to be
constitutional, and have therefore attempted to draw a statute which
not only was directed at the solution of the problems as I have suggested, but which-was constructed in a practical way so that it could
be actually adopted and put into use, and rather than attempt too much
in formulating such a statute and run the risk of losing all, the committee has erred on the conservative side. Here it is:
Section 1. Where the existence of mental disease or derangement on the part of any person becomes an issue in the trial of a case,
the judge of the trial court may summon one or more disinterested
qualified experts, not exceeding three, to testify at the trial. In case
the judge shall issue the summons before the trial is begun, he shall
notify counsel for both parties of the witnesses so summoned. Upon
the trial of the case, the witnesses summoned by the court may- be
cross-examined by counsel for poth parties in the case. Such summoning of witnesses by the court shall not preclude either party from using
other expert witnesses at the trial.
Section 2. In criminal cases, no testimony regarding the mental
condition of the accused shall be received from witnesses summoned by
the accused until the expert witnesses summoned by the prosecution
have been given an opportunity to examine the accused.
Section 3. Whenever in the trial of a criminal case the existence
of mental disease on the part of the accused, either at the time of the
trial or at the time of the commission of the alleged wrongful act,
becomes an issue in the case, the judge of the court before which the
accused is to be tried or is being tried shall commit the accused to the
state hospital for the insane, to be detained there for purposes of
observation until further order of court. The court shall direct the
superintendent of the hospital to permit all the expert witnesses summoned in the case to have free access to the accused for purposes of
observation. The court may also direct the chief physician of the hospital to prepare a report regarding the mental condition of the accused.
This report may be introduced in evidence at the trial under oath of
said chief physician, who may be cross-examined regarding the report
by counsel for both sides.
Section 4. Each expert witness may prepare a written report upon
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the mental condition of the person in question, and such report may be
read by the witness at the trial. If the witness presenting the report
was called by one of the opposing parties, he may be cross-examined
regarding his report by counsel for the other party. If the witness was
summoned by the court, he may be cross-examined regarding his report
by counsel for both parties.
Section 5. Where expert witnesses have examined the person
whose mental condition is an element in the case, they may consult with
or without the direction of court, and if possible prepare a joint report
to be introduced at the trial.
This projected statute so impressed the American Institute that it
was received and adopted without a dissenting voice.
With the adoption of such a statute as this, the difficulties with the
whole question of criminal procedure and medical expert testimony are
not by any means all solved, in fact a beginning only is made. I wish
briefly to touch upon a few additional points as they relate to the two
professions-law and medicine.
In the first place, the criminal law, as it exists on the statute books;
is essentially a law of revenge; it was formulated in the spirit of the
Mosaic law, and if it is not always administered in that spirit it is not
because it does not exist in that form. The feeling of revenge is a
feeling common in the breasts of mankind, but one which has progressively had to be restrained as civilization advanced, until finally the
revenge which the community wreaked upon any individual was done
by a specially delegated portion of that community. This .was an essential change as society became complex and divided its responsibilities
and its duties, but within the last, the scientific era, a still further and
more significant advance has been made. We have come to learn a
great deal about the human individual, and the more we learn about
him the more we know that there is little or nothing to be gained by
writing the spirit of revenge into our criminal statutes. Crime does not
exist apart from the criminal, although the law for centuries has been
endeavoring to consider crime as something that did so exist, just as
it has been endeavoring to consider other hypothetical absolutes as
having concrete existence. It is the same with the concept of insanity.
nInianity has no existence in iself; in fact it has no existence at all in
medicine--it is purely a social and lPgeal concept, and even them can
only be dealt with in the concr te'instance of an actual individual. As
soon a science began to deal with 'the individual, instead of with
a btract concepts, such as -criilie and inganity, the medieval attitude
towards the offender against the social requirements began to drop
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away. If the individual be studied carefully it can always be seen how
a given crime issues logically out of the antecedents in that individual's
life. The unfolding of the individual's character in relation to the
total situation in which the crime occurred makes it at once understandable. In this day and age the revenge attitude of society against
the criminal is unintelligent. The attitude that should be assumed and
which science is forcing upon the courts and the legislatures is the
attitude of endeavoring to efficiently deal with the problems that the
individual presents, with the deep conviction that arbitrary ternis of
imprisonment and capital punishment are not the last words in serving
this end.
Present day psychology is essentially behavioristic in its trend; it
seeks-to understand man's conduct in terms of his reactions to stimuli
from within as well as from without. The criminal law seeks to define
certain types of conduct which society believes should be dealt with by
punitive measures. Definitions tend necessarily to become static and
to limit advances in thinking. The tendency is to press all conduct into
the mould of the definitions rather than to approach it with an open
mind that seeks only to understand and explain it. And finally the definition must of necessity, because it is an abstraction, be vague in face
of a concrete issue and therefore it easily lends itself to all sorts of
interpretations, which interpretations become the creatures of the opposing sides in their endeavor to effect their respective purposes. It is
time that criminal procedure should aim at correcting bad social adjustments rather than vicariously serving alone the spirit of revenge. All
social maladaptions whether they come within the purview of the criminal law or the lunacy law should be dealt with with the sole end in
view of curing the fault and it must be evident to all students of social
phenomena and psychological problems nowadays that that can not be
brought about by measures that are solely repressive in character. Recent studies in psychology in general and in fields of criminal psychology
in particular have demonstrated this over and over again. The reform
in prison management that has been wrought during recent times has
grown out of this conviction, more or less consciously appreciated, and
it is now high time that the principles should find concrete recognition
in reforms of procedure. This does not mean, of course, that repressive
measures or punishments should be done away with but that they
should be more scientifically used with this constructive end more consciously in mind. Punishment is of value in Making the anti-social
pathway the least attractive, but should be associated with other methods which are calculated to emphasize in a positive manner the forms
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of conduct which are socially useful. Parole laws and the indeterminate sentence are movements in this direction.
With these few general remarkF I will make a few comments upon
some of the vital elements in the present criminal procedure.
I will discuss only three of the concepts which are controlling in the
administration of the criimnal law and which I think need to be
reviewed in order that the best interest of society and the offender may
both be better safeguarded, and to the end that criminal procedure shall
have these ends more consciously in view and therefore more under
intelligent control.
Prejudice. The legal machinery has been created largely with the
idea of considering the offenders in as impersonal a way as possible.
Judge and jury are supposed to have no personal feelings involved but
to be able to consider the evidence solely upon its merits and arrive at
conclusions free from personal bias and from the operations of emotional factors. An attempt is made to so present the evidence that it
may have a coldly intellectual consideration and the punishment meted
out under such circumstances is apparently supposed to approximate or
at least to aim at abstract justice. The impracticability of supposing
that anything like abstract justice can be attained is perfectly evident
to anyone with the least experience in actual trials of concrete issues.
Everyone with such experience must soon come to realize, no matter
how idealistically he may have originally approached the problem, how
essentially human the whole proceeding really is. Of course, to make
such a statement as this is really the tritest of truisms, yet few realize
how the passions, the emotions, the prejudices really find an outlet in
the course of the trial and are expressed in the final judgment. .
Aside from this statement it must be evident to all students of
present-day psychology and philosophy that such a thing as an unprejudiced individual does not exist.
The reason why I make this statement so definitely is because it
is generally conceded by those engaged in the study of psychology that
mental actions are necessarily conditioned by all that has gone into the
composition of the fabric of the mind whether all those elements which
for the time being are operative are present in consciousness or not.
In other words an opinion is the outcome of the whole tendency of the
individual as it has been built up during his lifetime, and whether he
thinks it or not, he is swayed at every point by these ingrained
tendencies.
Every human being must therefore of necessity approach every
problem with the natural bias of his own personality make-up based,
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as it is, upon the totality of his hereditary tendencies, his upbringing and
his past experiences. The existence of such a background which must
give form and color to any present experience is not only generally
recognized but has been specifically dealt with in considering the effect
which it has in determining judicial decisions.'
Prejudice in this sense is an ineradicable element of the human
mind and the best that can be done is to attempt to reduce it to a minimum. The medical expert who is aware of the true state of affairs is
a safei witness than one who is blind to its possibilities and the same
may be said of the judge or in fact anyone searching for the truth in
the tangled network of human motives. The law should face this fact
squarely and no longer refuse to see it. The procedure in attempting
to get at the facts would be made simpler by so doing.
The papers cited in the footnotes indicate how judicial opinions can
be shown to follow logically from the make-up, the previous experience
and the emotional attitudes of judges, and although the grounds for
prejudice are not ordinarily apparent, still trial lawye-rs learn these
facts by experience and regularly attempt to bring their cases before
judges whom they know to be favorably disposed toward their attitudes in the particular issue involved.2 A similar understanding of the
expert is due him rather than an instinctive condemnation for prejudices which he necessarily harbors.
The Hypothetical Question. I firmly believe that the hypothetical
question is, from at least a philosophical point of view, an absurdity
and should be discarded. In the first place, the patent criticism against
the hypothetical question is that it has absolutely no reason for existence, so far as I can see, except a reason founded upon what seems
to me a rather unnecessary effort to conform to a theory, namely, the
theory that it is the jury's function and not the expert's to decide
whether the person is or is not of unsound mind. This is certainly a
quibbling in unessential matters of the character which is at present
discrediting the whole structure of criminal procedure in the eyes of
the public. What possible reason can there be for denying the right of
the jury to hear the expert express his opinion about the defendant in
any such way as this at least? If it worked, if the expert, as a matter
'Everson, George: The Human Element in Justice. Jour. Am. Inst. Crim.
Law and Criminology, May, 1919.
Schroeder, T.: The Psych61ogical Study of Judicial Opinion. Californiia
Law Review, Jan., 1918.
2
Another way in which lawyers regularly recognize this principle is by
introducing evidence which they know will be ruled out. By its introduction
they have put it before and into the minds of the jury and no ruling on its
admissibility can eradicate it and make it as naught. It is bound to play its
part in the final decision.
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of fact, did not express his opinion about the defendant, then perhaps
there might be some sense in this attitude; but when the expert answers
the hypothetical question the jury and everybody else knows that as a
matter of fact he is expressing his opinion with regard to the defendant,
no matter whether he says he is or he is not, and no matter whether he
attempts to put the defendant out of his mind or not, because it is a
psychological impossibility for the expert to take all of the facts that are
in evidence and which are included in the hypothetical question and
which relate in their evidential value to the defendant, and to no one
else, and to consider them by themselves, apart from the knowledge
that he has that they do relate to the defendant in this way. He may
think that he can discard such knowledge and consider the matter
judicially, but I do not believe it psychologically possible. Therefore,
the theory of the hypothetical question is based upon a state of affairs
which it is presumed to bring about, but which in fact is not brought
about and everybody knows that it is not. Why should such illogical
requirements continue?
The whole method of examination based upon hypothetical inquiries involves the assumption that the witness is able to reach conclusions regarding the statements set forth in the hypothetical question
apart from all other considerations, as if these separate statements
could be taken out of relation to everything else and be considered in
the abstract. The practical absurdity of the position is at once apparent
if we attempt to apply it to certain fundamental elements in most everyone's psychological equipment. For example, if the witness were asked
to put out of mind, for the purpose of the question, all his knowledge
of the multiplication tables and give his opinion of what the product
would be of multiplying two by two; or to put aside all knowledge he
had of reading and then handed a printed paper and asked his opinion
of what was set forth thereon. This is at once seen to be absurd, but
the request is no more imposisble than to ask him to put aside all
knowledge, feeling, attitudes and tendencies that he may have acquired
in his lifetime or, more specifically, in his connection with the issue on
trial. Such an understanding of the background upon which all
opinions rest is due the expert rather than a wholesale condemnation
for a state of mind over which he of necessity can have, at least, only
a limited control.
Further than this, I might urge at considerable length, from a
philosophical standpoint, the essential absurdity of the hypothetical
question. Acts cannot be separated from actors, mental states from
people having them; the two cannot be considered apart, and it is not
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sufficient to my mind to correct this philosophical error that a hypothetical individual be assumed who is the bearer of all these alleged
states of mind and body. However, I will not enlarge upon philosophical considerations. I may only add that in a large experience I
have never known a hypothetical question, in a trial involving the
mental condition of the defendant, which, in my opinion, offered a fair
presentation of the case. It is admittedly prepared to contain only
those elements which favor the side offering it, despite the fact that
most of them are contradicted by the opposite side. It eliminates from
consideration every human element which every common-sense man
takes into consideration when he formulates an opinion. There are
statements of fact in the hypothetical question which the expert has to
sit and listen to, and knows because he has heard the testimony and seen
the person who gave it to be absolutely worthless, and yet such a statement is given the same value in the question as any other'. I reiterate
that it is not strange to me tlat expert testimony has been so unsatisfactory and when I conceive of the impossible things that are asked of
the expert, I simply marvel that he has been able to meet the requirements in any measure at all.
Responsibility. One other matter, the question of responsibility.
Strangely, and for what reason I know not, the expert who is not
permitted to say that the defendant is sane or insane, because that
sacred duty resides with the jury, is permitted to say whether in his
opinion the defendant was responsible or irresponsible at a certain time.
Whether I am technically right in this as a matter of practice I am not
sure. The point I wish to make is that in the law responsibility is dealt
with just like crime and insanity, as having some kind of a nebulous
separate existence. The criminal is either supposed to have it or not
to have it, as much as if he might or might not be possessed of certain
real estate, or some other equally tangible asset. Such ways of dealing
with human beings show an absolute lack of understanding of -the
principles of conduct, and belong to the same stage of development as
the spirit of revenge. To conceive that an individual is either absolutely
responsible or absolutely irresponsible is to fly in the face of perfectly
patent facts that are in everybody's individual experience and is only
comparable to such beliefs of the middle ages as, that a person is
possessed of a devil or is not possessed of a devil, and is therefore a
free moral agent. Certain steps in advance have been made in this
crude concept. France, for example, I believe has a statute of graduated responsibility. Whether any such similar provision exists in this
country I do not know.
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My own conception of the way in which the responsibility question
is met in criminal trials is this: The jury listens to the evidence that is
offered in the case, it hears something of the history of the crime, the
conditions which led up to it, its actual performance, and the behavior
of the defendant thereafter. It learns also, more or less, of various
surrounding circumstances, so that from a rather superficial standpoint the jury, so to speak, has the crime framed in a set of events which
relate to it and which serve to some extent to explain it. Now the
jury takes all these things into consideration and in doing so represents,
or stands for, in miniature, the body of society of which it is a part.
The jury represents the minds of the community, and its action is binding upon that community, who, through the machinery of the courts,
has chosen it to represent them. Now having considered all these facts,
the jury makes up its mind whether they think the man ought to be
punished or not. Jf they think he ought to be punished they conclude
him to be responsible, and therefore, guilty; if they think the circumstances are such that in their feelings towards him they feel that he
ought to be let off, they find him irresponsible, and therefore not guilty.
In other words, the community, through the medium of its selected
agents, the jury, projects its own feelings upon the accused, so that
from this point of view responsibility is something which exists in the
minds of the jury rather than in that of the defendant.
To my mind the function of the expert should be to bring his
specialized knowledge to the service of the particular issue being tried,
and upon the witness stand to explain as far in detail as his examination
permits the mental state of the defendant. To this end it is just as
absurd that the experts for the prosecution may not be permitted to
see the defendant as it is that he may be permitted not to testify, as it
is also equally absurd that the court should be called upon to instruct
the jury and should have to so do that the failure to testify by the
defendant shall not be considered against him. Action is not always
positive, but may be negative; it requires as much energy, as much
determination, and sometimes more, not to do a certain thing, for
example, to reply to a question, as it. does to do that thing, and the
refusal of an individual to comply with a certain request can be made
the object of a deduction as to the reasons of that refusal and as to
the underlying mental state of the individual as accurately and as properly as a compliance with the request may be used in like manner. I
can easily see, however, that in the present state of affairs a refusal
of the prisoner to testify may well be considered as having a certain
justification, however, which would be removed if the people did the

510

WILLIAM A. WHITE

logical thing and showed themselves as keenly alive to the protection
of an innocent man as they do to the prosecution of a guilty one. Every
community that has a district attorney should have also a public
defender, and the expert should be freed, as far as existing conditions
permit, along the lines suggested by the proposed statute from all bias,
either actual or implied.
The logical outcome of such suggestions as I have made are in part
incorporated in the proposed statute. I refer specifically to the opportunity provided the expert of reading his report. This would enable
him to set forth a coherent, connected account of the defendant, analyzing his character makeup, show how he came to be the manner of person
he was, and would include a setting forth of the crime in this setting
showing just how it issued and was explained. This should be the
specific function of the expert. The jurors then can pass intelligently
upon the issue with such a complete picture of the manner of man the
criminal is before them.
As a matter of practice, it is rarely permitted the expert to set
forth his opinion in a connected discourse of this sort. He is usually
subjected to innumerable interruptions in the efforts of opposing counsel to exclude certain matter they canceive to be inimical to their interests, with the result that the jury gets a disconnected, chopped-up
statement which does not begin to present fairly the expert's real opinion. The cross-examination may then very properly ask all manner
of questions, pulling apart the expert's statement, presenting hypotheses, etc., for the 'double purpose of testing the expert's knowledge
and learning more in detail just how he came to his conclusion.
The principles which I advocate are that the criminal and not the
crime should be made the matter of prime consideration and that the
sentence, or better the decision of the court, should 'be calculated to cure
the social illness as it has been shown to exist in the conduct of the
defendant. Under the operation of these principles a defendant who
was only charged with a minor offense might well have to spend the
rest of his life more or less restricted in his liberty if an analysis of his
make-up and a study of his behavior showed that he never sufficiently
improved or profited by his experience to warrant discharge as a free
citizen into the community. In the same way a person who had committed a serious offense might be ultimately discharged after a comparatively brief internment. It is the same here as in the practice of medicine. All cases of pneumonia are not treated alike just because the
disease happens to be pneumonia. The patient is treated and allowances have to be made for age, previous condition of health, concurrent
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diseases of organs other than the lungs, power of resistance, etc., etc.
The patient is treated and not the disease and it is as illogical to sentence a person who has committed a certain offense to a specific term
of imprisonment as it would be to decide when a patient is admitted
to a hospital the day upon which he shall be discharged. The hospital
patient is not discharged until it is thought that he is well enough to
leave and the criminal should not be discharged until there is good
reason for believing that he is able to take his place as a responsible
member of society.
To approach the problem of criminology in this way would require
considerable changes in our legal machinery. It would require, among
other things, that judges should specialize along the lines of their
individual interests just as physicians specialize in their profession. A
trend in this direction is already apparent in the establshment of special
courts, in particular juvenile and domestic relations courts. Such
courts tend to come to be presided over by justices who have special
interests in the matters brought before them and such justices tend to
develop a constructive attitude toward the problems brought before
them, much as does the physician, rather than be satisfied at fitting the
particular case into some definition and thus passing- an arbitrary,
predetermined sentence.
Until such day as the criminal courts can be conducted after this
fashion effort should be continued to give the expert as favorable a
placement in the scheme as the judge and jury now hold. He needs to
be placed in as near as possible an unprejudiced attitude toward the
issues. The old way of requiring the expert to hear all the evidence,
rather than pass upon a hypothetical question, was psychologically far
preferable, but of course too time consuming for the present day.
Theoretically I believe the jury should be limited to a determination of
the facts; that is, in a criminal case they should pass only upon whether
the accused did or did not commit the anti-social act as charged. If he
is found guilty then it is the right of the state to prescribe the treatment
which, after careful consideration by those skilled in such matters,
seems best calculated to effect the best results in the end. In this way
many a youngster might well be saved from a career of crime by not
contaminating him with the influences of the prison and definitely antisocial characters could be indefinitely confined at useful occupation
instead of repeatedly being set free to take up their criminal practice
again with the necessary expense and lost motion incident to again
apprehending them, and a repetition of the same old process of trial
and conviction.

